We examine the effect of behavioral biases among professional investors in the case of structured products investment. We outline several key features embedded in various structured products and associate each with specific behavioral bias identified in the literature of decision theory. We perform an experiment to test the possible impact of each behavioral bias on decisions pertaining to investments in structured products. Our findings reveal that, to varying degrees, the examined behavioral biases affect professional investors. As the experiment results show us that even professional investors are not really immune to behavioral biases, we try to figure out whether within this group of professional investors, there are certain personal characteristics which may influence the magnitude of the bias. Using logit, probit and linear probability models we show that the tested behavioral finance patterns are so deeply rooted in human behavior that they are difficult to overcome by any one of the personal characteristics we analyze. In demonstrating the impact of these behavioral biases on investors, our results can support the institution of specific regulation for structured products to improve investor protection. The proposed regulation should apply on both professional and nonprofessional investors.
Introduction
It is a convention in financial economics literature that the behavior of individual investors is less relevant as financial markets are driven by institutional investors. These professional investors are likely to be rational and to invest based on the use of efficient analytical tools. Therefore, it is the marginal professional investor who, by exploiting arbitrage opportunities, sets the prices in the market. For instance, it is argued that any research that ignores the use of professional traders is likely to be received passively because nonprofessional individuals are unlikely to have any substantial impact on market price since they are too far removed from the price discovery process (Locke and Mann (2000) ).
There are numerous reasons to suspect that financial professionals" behavior may differ from nonprofessional behavior due to training, regulation, market experience, information accessibility, etc. But, it is not clear that professional investors are really immune to behavioral biases. Hirshleifer (2001) argues that many behavioral finance patterns are so deeply rooted in human behavior that they are difficult to overcome by learning. Menkhoff and Nikiforow (2009) provided evidence to Hirshleifer"s hypothesis by testing this on fund managers. Their findings show that the endorsement of behavioral finance has a significant impact on professionals" perception of markets and support the hypothesis that many behavioral biases are difficult to overcome by learning, even though the fund managers analyzed have very strong incentives to learn efficient behavior.
In this paper we examine the performance of behavioral biases among professional investors in the case of structured products investment. Structured products are pre-packaged financial instruments comprising securities and derivatives bundled into a single derivative instrument. One of the key characteristics of structured products is that the return is determined 3 by a pre-specified formula, which sets out the product"s performance in any possible future scenario. Unlike mutual and other types of investment funds, the outcome of a structured product is not a function of on-going active investment.
The structured products were first sold in the U.S. in the 1980s, but interest in structured products as a method of portfolio diversification and as a sole investment has grown in the last decade. In Ofir and Wiener (2013) we provide evidence that the global market for structured products experienced a massive growth in the last 5 years. As we demonstrate there, analyzing typical structured product by figuring out the underlying financial assets and pricing them, demonstrates a transfer of riskless wealth from the investors to the issuers.
Figuring out the transfer of riskless wealth, the explanation for the consistent growth of this market cannot be deduced from the neoclassical economic theory. We argue that most structured products available on the market are designed to exploit a number of common behavioral biases observed in the area of decision-making under uncertainty. In Ofir and Wiener (2013) we find that retail investors tend to be affected by these behavioral biases, which favor structured products investments, despite the fact that a rational assessment of investor welfare would lead to an alternative investment.
In this paper we identify several features of structured products, and show how these are associated with specific behavioral biases. The insights are derived from theories associated with various aspects of decision theory: loss aversion, the disposition effect, herd behavior, the ostrich effect and hindsight bias. We analyze the relation between the identified features and the behavioral biases.
To examine professional investors" decision-making in relation to the investment in structured products, we conduct an experiment. The experiment tests each bias individually to 4 determine whether professional investors are influenced by a given bias to such an extent that they favor investment in a structured product over another beneficial alternative. Our findings demonstrate that not only nonprofessional investors but also professional investors tend to be affected by these behavioral biases.
As the experiment results show us that even professional investors are not really immune to behavioral biases, we also try to figure out whether within this group of professional investors, there are certain personal characteristics which may influence the magnitude of the bias. In order to test it we are using logit, probit and linear probability models when y is the conviction of a specific behavioral bias and x is the full set of explanatory variables, i.e. the personal characteristics including gender, higher education, professional experience, license, investment committee membership, and board membership.
Among all the tested behavioral biases the estimates from the three models tell a consistent story. The signs of the coefficients are the same across models, and the same variables are statistically significant in each model. We found that overall the personal characteristics do not carry any meaningful explanatory power on the tendency for behavioral biases. Apparently, the tested behavioral finance patterns are so deeply rooted in human behavior that they are difficult to overcome by any one of the personal characteristics we analyzed.
In demonstrating the impact of these behavioral biases on investors, our results can support the institution of specific regulation for structured products to improve investor protection. Moreover, the offered regulation should be applied on both professional and nonprofessional investor, since both groups found to be influenced by the tested behavioral biases.
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We offer a regulation that would compel issuers to reveal the effective fees they charge investors. In disclosing the effective fees the investors will be able to compare between investment alternatives in a very simple way, and will be able to decide if they are willing to pay this amount for the recognized behavioral bias. This effective value is known to the issuers; therefore its calculation will not bear any additional cost.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 analyzes the relation between the identified features in structured products investment and the behavioral biases. In this section we also summarize the existing literature on the chosen behavioral biases. Appendix 1 summarizes selected structure features and the corresponding behavioral biases. In section 3 we review the existing literature regarding the performance of each examined behavioral bias by professional investors. Section 4 of the paper describes the experiment and its results. The original experiment was drafted in Hebrew; a translation of the experiment to English is provided in Appendix 2. In section 5 we test whether within this group of professional investors, there are certain personal characteristics which influence the magnitude of the bias. In section 6 of the paper we discuss the policy implications of our finding, provide concluding remarks and particularly, discuss the implications for structured products regulation.
A Behavioral Analysis of Structured Products
This paper focuses on five features commonly found in structured products, and the behavioral biases associated with them. In this section we outline these behavioral biases and analyze the relation between each bias and the corresponding feature. 6
2.A. Loss Aversion
Loss aversion refers to the tendency for people strongly to prefer avoiding losses than acquiring gains. A key conclusion of Kahneman and Tversky"s (1979) study of decision-making under uncertainty is that choices are best explained by assuming that the significant carriers of utility are not states of wealth, but rather changes relative to a neutral reference point, such as the status quo. In the theory they developed, value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets. The value function is concave for gains, convex for losses, and is steeper for losses than for gains. Empirical estimates of loss aversion demonstrate that the perceived disutility of loss is twice as great as the utility of gain (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) . Structured products are considered by investors as less risky investments, primarily because most promise principal protection. Principal protection enables loss-averting investors to avoid losses and enjoy gains in certain circumstances. Investors, especially retail investors, consider principal protection a very attractive feature, and their decision whether to invest in a structured product is strongly affected by it.
It is well worth noting in this context that principal protection is usually nominal and not real, and it does not carry any compensation for the time value of money. Moreover, in some structured products the principal protection is in foreign currency which exposes the principal to foreign currency exchange rate risks. In short, principal protection is not necessarily what one would wish it to be, nor perhaps what investors assume it to be.
2.B. The Disposition Effect
Identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , the disposition effect refers to an aversion to loss realization. Shefrin and Statman (1985) examine this feature within the context of financial markets. Specifically, they examine decisions to realize gains and losses in a market setting.
They develop a descriptive theory of capital gain and loss realization in which investors tend to "sell winners too early and ride losers too long", relative to the prescriptions of the normative theory. Using evidence that suggests that this tendency applies in real-life financial markets, Shefrin and Statman demonstrate how the tendency to sell winners and ride losers emerges in prospect theory in the following example:
Consider an investor who purchased a stock one month ago for $50 and who finds that the stock is now selling at $40. The investor must now decide whether to realize the loss or hold the stock for one more period. To simplify the discussion, assume that there are no taxes or transaction costs. In addition, suppose that one of two equiprobable outcomes will emerge during the coming period: either the stock will increase in price by $10 or decrease in price by $10.
According to prospect theory, our investor frames his choice as a choice between the following two lotteries:
A. Sell the stock now and realize a $10 loss.
B. Hold the stock for one more period, given 50-50 odds between losing an additional $10 or "breaking even."
Since the choice between these lotteries is associated with the convex portion of the Sshaped value function, prospect theory implies that B will be selected over A. That is, the investor will ride his losing stock. An analogous argument demonstrates how prospect theory accounts for a propensity towards profit-taking.
In our research, the relevant behavioral phenomenon is the aversion to loss realization, or in other words, the disposition to "ride losers". Many structured products include mandatory conversion provisions. Conversion is triggered when the price of the underlying asset falls past a predetermined threshold during the investment period. If the price does not cross this threshold, the investor receives the principal plus a relatively high return. The conversion into the "losing" asset typically reflects a higher price (i.e. the market price at time of issue) than the market price of the asset at the time of the structured product"s maturity.
The mandatory conversion feature is activated by the investor tendencies to "ride losers" because the conversion into "losing" assets puts off the realization of losses. Investors will continue to ride the losing asset in the near future and will not realize the loss caused by the investment in the structured product. Investors tend to continue holding the "losing" shares after the structured product matures. This behavior enables them to avoid the loss realization.
2.C. Herd Behavior
Herd behavior can explain the phenomenon of large numbers of people acting in the same way at the same time. Large stock market trends, bubbles, and crashes often begin and end with periods in which a large number of investors buy or sell stocks. Individual investors join the crowd of others in a rush to enter or exit the market.
The literature on herd behavior is extensive. Leibenstein (1950) defined it as the extent to which demand for an asset is increased due to the fact that others also purchase the asset. He explained the motivations underlying herd behavior as "the desire of people to purchase a commodity in order to get into "the swim of things"; in order to conform with the people they wish to be associated with; in order to be fashionable or stylish; or, in order to appear to be "one of the boys."" Herd behavior has also been explained in terms of a network effect. The network effect was first defined by Katz and Shapiro (1985) as follows: "There are many products for which the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good. … The utility that a given user derives from the good depends on the number of other users who are in the same "network" as he or she." The main assumption underlying the network effect is the existence of complete information. It is assumed that individuals possess identical motivations and expectations regarding the benefits of goods. Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer, and Welch (1992) modeled herd behavior under imperfect information. In their model, herd behavior occurs "when it was optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information." The decision-maker observes the actions of others and assumes that they hold more valuable information than he or she.
The most common explanation regarding herd behavior in financial markets is this last one. Nonprofessional investors follow the behavior of other investors, assuming that the latter hold more valuable information on the market conditions and trends. Since this research focus on professional investors and the assumption of complete information, underlying the network effect explanation is not valid in financial markets, we focus on the Leibenstein"s explanation, which is a pure behavioral one.
Investment in structured products enables the investor not only to conform to the people with whom she wishes to be associated, without risking the entire funds in a specific investment.
If, on the one hand, investors are motivated solely by the information presumably held by other investors, they would invest directly in the underlying asset. If, on the other hand, investors are motivated by a desire to be fashionable and are uncertain about the value of third-party information, they would invest in structured products, which provide only partial exposure to the underlying asset, but leads to the full benefit of conforming to people with whom they wish to.
Structured products, providing investors exposure to commodities, emerging markets and to exotic financial products can exploit herd behavior. For example, structured notes linked to emerging market indices facilitate portfolio diversification in potential growth economies.
Investors who purchase these market-linked products can conform to people with whom they wish to be associated without exposing the entire fund to the risk of the specific emerging market.
2.D. The Ostrich Effect
The impact of liquidity on the prices of financial assets occupies center stage in the finance literature. The rational pricing of financial assets supports the assessment of a positive correlation between liquidity and prices; i.e., illiquidity has an adverse impact on asset value.
When compared with otherwise identical illiquid assets, liquid assets should have a lower yieldto-maturity, given the opportunity to liquidate the position at any stage during the investment horizon and the possibility to realize even a larger return in the market without risking the expected return for holding the investment to maturity 1 . Galai and Sade (2006) found that investors prefer to hold illiquid assets and are even willing to pay a premium for them. They attribute this seemingly anomalous behavior to an aversion to receiving information on potential interim losses. The ostrich effect is defined as avoiding apparently risky financial situations by pretending they do not exist. In other words, certain individuals, when faced with uncertainty, prefer investments for which the risk is unreported to similar investments (as far as risk and return are concerned) for which the risks are reported frequently. Support for ostrich effect behavior can be found in various types of financial markets and countries.
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Most structured products are non-negotiable, and hence illiquid. Investors can avoid apparently risky financial situations throughout the lifetime of an illiquid structure by assuming these situations do not exist. The only situation with which the investors are concerned is the one occurring at maturity.
2.E. Hindsight Bias
Hindsight and foresight differ formally in the information available to the observer. Hindsightful decision-makers possess knowledge regarding past outcomes. Foresightful decision-makers do not possess this knowledge. Initially documented by Fischhoff (1975) , the hindsight bias refers to the tendency to alter perceptions of the inevitability of an event once the outcome is known.
Fischhoff found that reporting an outcome"s occurrence increases its perceived probability of occurrence, and that decision-makers who have received outcome knowledge are unaware of the change in the perceived probability of occurrence. Therefore, reporting an outcome produces an unjustified increase in its perceived predictability, for it seems to have appeared more likely than it actually was.
When the hindsight bias is operating, events that occurred are retrospectively seen as having been more likely to occur and events that did not occur are retrospectively seen as having been less likely to occur. Investors tend to be unaware of the role outcome knowledge plays on their perceptions. Thus, investors tend to believe that seemingly inevitable outcomes were largely apparent in foresight, and these investors tend to invest in products that rely on realized outcomes.
Most structured products rely on an outcome that occurred in the recent past, and are based on the presumed increase in the probability that the same outcome will reoccur in the near future. These structured products guarantee investors relatively high returns should a recent outcome reoccur at maturity. The hindsight investor assesses higher probability to this and tends to favor investing in the structured product.
Investor Sophistication and Behavioral Biases
In this section we outline the five chosen behavioral biases from the perspective of professional investors. We analyze the existing literature regarding the performance of each examined behavioral bias by sophisticated investors. The only bias which is not included in this section is the Ostrich Effect, since to the best of our knowledge it has not been tested in the context of professional investors.
3.A. Loss Aversion
Kahneman and Tversky"s (1979) groundbreaking study on choice under uncertainty revealed that individual decision makers are concerned with changes in their financial wealth and that they are averse to losses from these changes. Their descriptive model is not exploring any differentiation between professional and nonprofessional decision makers regarding their aversion to losses. Coval and Shumway (2005) found strong evidence that Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) traders are highly loss averse. These traders generally close out their positions by the end of each trading day, providing a clean horizon over which they can evaluate their performance. To test loss aversion they split the trading day into two periods and test whether traders with profitable mornings increase or reduce their afternoon risk taking. Loss aversion suggests that traders who have experienced losses are most inclined to take subsequent risks, and traders with profitable mornings reduce their exposure to afternoon risk. They found that traders are far more likely to take on additional afternoon risk following morning losses than following morning gains.
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These findings suggest that expected utility theory may not model professional traders" behavior well. Since the traders can affect market prices, the findings lend credence to behavioral economics and finance models, which are relaxing inherent assumptions used in standard financial economics asset pricing models.
3.B. The Disposition Effect
There is a large amount of research concerning the disposition effect, including studies that concentrate on the influence of investor sophistication and market experience on the performance of this behavioral bias. In general, the findings show that the disposition effect affects individual investors, future traders, professional account managers, experimental laboratory subjects, and financial institutions. When reviewing the related studies, most of the studies supply an evidence of the disposition effect is uniformly documented across many investor types.
Odean (1998) tested the disposition effect by analyzing trading records for 10,000
accounts at a large discount brokerage house. He found that these investors sell winners more rapidly than losers. Even when the alternative rational motivations (as rebalancing portfolios, avoiding higher trading costs of low priced stocks, or tax motivations) are controlled for, these investors continue to prefer selling winners and holding losers. Their behavior is consistent with the prospect theory, the disposition effect and with a mistaken belief that their winners and losers will mean revert. Shapira and Venezia (2001) analyzed the investment patterns of a large number of clients of a major Israeli brokerage house during 1994. They compared the behavior of clients making independent investment decisions to that of investors whose accounts were managed by brokerage professionals in order to test whether the tendency to sell winners quicker than losers also holds for professional investors. Their results demonstrate that disposition effect exists not 14 only for independent investors, but also for professionals. This suggests that the effect may exercise a more significant influence on pricing. However, the disposition effect was significantly weaker for professional investors than for amateurs, indicating that professional training and experience may reduce judgmental biases, even though it cannot eliminate them.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) used a unique data set describing the buys, sells and holds of individuals and institutions in the Finnish stock market on a daily basis. They found evidence that investors are reluctant to realize losses and that past returns and historical price patterns affect trading. Conditional on trade, sophisticated investor classes place less weight on past returns in deciding whether the trade is to be a buy or sell. By contrast, the less sophisticated investors (households, general government, and non-profit institutions) are more predisposed to sell than to buy stocks with large past returns. Garvey and Murphy (2004) examined data from a highly profitable stock trading team to test whether professional traders are susceptible to the disposition effect. They found that these professional traders held their losing trades much longer than their winning trades. The group of traders studied earned more than $1.4 million in intraday trading profits, but they realized their winning trades at a much faster rate than their losing trades. This tendency lowered their profitability. Moreover, they found that when the traders limited their risk exposure by trading in small share sizes, in low priced stocks, or during periods of low volatility, the discrepancy between losing and winning holding times rose.
Lock and Mann (2005) studied the trading behavior of professional futures traders on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). They examined the discipline of professional traders and their tendency to exhibit the disposition effect. The definition of "discipline" is the adherence to trade exit strategies, which measured by either the general speed of trading or by the avoidance of riding losses (holding onto positions with large loss exposure). They found that traders consistently hold losing trades for significantly longer periods of time than winning trades.
Moreover, Lock and Mann (2005) found that traders offsetting losses more quickly are more likely to be successful in the future, and that traders who hold onto relatively large losing trades for longer periods (more than ten minutes) are subsequently less likely to be successful.
However, as opposed to Odean (1998) they were unable to discover any contemporaneous measurable costs associated with the apparent aversion to loss realization. To conclude, no evidence is available of a costly disposition effect among professional future traders, but a relative lack of discipline in realizing both gains and losses promptly is harmful to the probability of success.
Feng and Seasholes (2005) analyzed the influence of sophistication and trading experience on the performance of the disposition effect. They found that together, sophistication and trading experience eliminate the reluctance to realize losses and reduce the propensity to realize gains by 37%. Moreover, sophisticated investors are 67% less prone to the disposition effect than the average investor. Trading experience on its own attenuates up to 72% of the disposition effect, but does not totally eliminate the behavior. Neither sophistication nor trading experience alone eliminates the disposition effect. A combination of sophistication and trading experience eliminates the reluctance of investors to realize losses. While the reluctance of investors to realize losses is eliminated, there is no amount of investor sophistication and trading experience that eliminates an investor"s propensity to realize gains. Dahr and Zhu (2006) analyzed the trading records of a major discount brokerage house to investigate the disposition effect. In contrast to the other studies we describe in this section that have demonstrated the disposition effect by aggregating across investors, their main objective 16 was to identify differences in the disposition effect across individuals. Using demographic and socioeconomic variables as proxies for investor literacy, they found empirical evidence that wealthier individuals and individuals employed in professional occupation exhibit a lower disposition effect. Moreover, they found that trading frequency helps reduce the disposition effect, which supports other findings showing that trading frequency can eliminate some market anomalies (List 2003) .
To conclude, the disposition effect is one of the most widely documented biases in investor behavior. All the papers, by using different investor database which reflect different levels of investor"s sophistication, clearly document the existence of the disposition effect. Most of them found evidence that investor sophistication tends to reduce the magnitude of the bias
3.C. Herd Behavior
The question whether professional investors follow the lead or others when they trade is central to understanding the impact of their trading on financial markets and to understanding the way in which information becomes incorporated into market prices.
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) presented evidence on the herding behavior of pension fund managers. They tested the herding behavior by assessing the degree of correlation across money managers in buying and selling a given stock. The evidence suggests that pension fund managers herd relatively little in their trades in large stocks (those in the top two quintiles by market capitalization). They found some evidence of more herding in smaller stocks. Graham (1999) developed a model which implies that if an analyst has high reputation or low ability, he is likely to herd. The model was tested using data from analysts who publish investment newsletters. Consistent with the model"s implications, the empirical results indicate that a newsletter analyst is likely to herd if his reputation is high, and if his ability is low. Wermers (1999) studies the tendency of mutual fund managers to herd in their trades of stocks from 1975 to 1994. Although he found an average level of herding similar to that found by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , he found much higher levels of herding in small stocks and in trading by growth-oriented mutual funds. Moreover, he found that stocks bought by herds have, on average, contemporaneous and future returns that are higher than stocks sold by herds. Stocks that herds buy outperform stocks that they sell by 4 percent during the following six month, and this return difference is much more pronounced among small stocks. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) compare between herding by institutional investors and herding by individual investors. They found evidence that returns are strongly correlated with changes in institutional ownership over the herding period. The attribute it to the hypothesis that institutional investor"s herding has a larger impact on returns than individual investor"s herding.
Moreover, they found that stocks institutional investors purchase subsequently outperform those they sell.
Venezia, Nashikkar and Shapira (2010) investigated the factors affecting herding behavior by professionals and amateurs. They found that both amateurs and professionals tend to herd but the former tend to herd to a grater extant than the latter. The data reveal a weak correlation between amateurs" herding and stock market returns, as well as a significant correlation between returns and buy imbalances of both amateurs and professionals. Moreover, they found that herding is positively and significantly correlated with stock market volatility, and that there is a causality relationship between herding, especially amateurs", and market volatility.
It suggests that the amateurs group poses a greater threat to market stability than the professional group. Therefore, they conclude claiming that this implies that improving transparency, education, and information will help to mitigate market instability.
Herding behavior by both professional and retail investors is important because of its potential effect on fluctuations in prices and returns. The existing literature on herding behavior documented that both professional and individual investors tend to herd, with a stronger tendency found among the individual investors. The findings imply that both groups of investor bear a potential to influence the market prices and returns by herding behavior.
3.D. Hindsight Bias
Decision making in financial markets relies crucially on learning and information processing, carried by professional investors. Efficient learning requires comparing new information to previous expectations. The hindsight bias can be viewed as the inability to correctly remember the prior expectation after observing new information. Therefore, hindsight-biased professional investor hinders efficient information processing. Biased investors are not surprised by new information because "they knew it all along" as documented by Fischhoff (1975) and Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) . Bukszar and Connolly (1988) examined whether training and strategic decision making overcome the hindsight bias. In two experiments, advanced strategy MBA students analyzing a complex business case were unable to ignore information concerning the outcomes of decisions made in a case and systematically distorted their evaluations of initial decisions and projection for the future. In other words, they found that advanced strategic planning students are significantly vulnerable to hindsight bias. For our context, it is important to note that the subjects were MBA students and not professionals. Caution is needed in extrapolating from MBA students to the behavior of seasoned professional managers.
Biais and Weber (2009) collected data from investment bankers working in Frankfurt and
London. They found these bankers to be significantly hindsight-biased. They also found that more experienced bankers or bankers with more precise information were not less biased.
Moreover, using data on the bankers" compensation, they proxied bankers" performance.
Consistent with the hypothesis that the hindsight bias reduces performance, they found that the bankers in the highest earnings category had the lowest bias on average, i.e. bankers with low bias obtain significantly better performance. To test the robustness of the findings, they also checked that the results were not driven by other variables, such as the experience, overconfidence, or information of the bankers.
Testing Professionals' Conviction of Behavioral Biases in Structured Products

Investment
We designed a controlled experiment to test our hypothesis concerning the application of behavioral biases to investment decisions involving structured products. The purpose of the experiment is to find the influence of each behavioral bias on the investment decision taken by professional investors in structured products. Although a structured product is in fact a bundle of features associated with behavioral biases, in order to show that each single behavioral bias influence the investment decision, each behavioral bias was examined separately.
In order to compare between decision taken by professionals and nonprofessionals (examined in Ofir and Wiener (2013)), both groups received exactly the same experiment. To avoid different sets of incentive which can influence the decision taken by both groups of subjects, professionals and nonprofessionals, have been ask to take their own investment decisions, as opposed to their customers" investment decisions. The original experiment was drafted in Hebrew; a translation of the experiment to English is provided in Appendix 2.
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The experiment comprises seven investment decisions, each involving a binary choice between two mutually exclusive investment alternatives. The distinction between the two investment alternatives is based on the behavioral bias tested in the specific investment decision.
The difference between the investment alternatives was marked in order to make it salient for the subjects. The experiment also contains three additional ranking questions in order to neutralize the potential impact of other values on the investment decisions. These ranking question are relevant only to the part of the experiment which testing the influence of herd behavior on investors" decisions.
The general instructions describe a situation in which the subjects are in possession of a certain amount of money that they wish to invest in the best possible investment. The participants were instructed to choose only one out of the two investment alternatives for each investment decision. They were told that each investment decision should be considered separately and that in each investment decision, the same amount of money is available to them.
The exact initial fund was not specified to get experiment results which are independent of the magnitude of the funds.
4.1.Data
Our subject population consists of 573 subjects, 75% of them are investment advisors and 25%
are portfolio managers. The subject population reflects professional investors. The Law for the The descriptive statistics in Table 4A provide a picture of personal characteristics of the respondents. Out of the professionals group of subjects 74% are male and 26% are female, 5%
are board members and 20% are members of investment committees. The mean of responding professional investors has a university degree and a professional experience of 13.26 years. The experiment design and the results for each tested behavioral bias are described as follows: 22
4.A. Loss Aversion
In order to examine the impact of loss aversion on professionals" investment decision in structured products, the subjects faced two investment decisions. Both investment decisions offer the investor a choice between a risky investment in a one-year deposit that is dependent on the exchange rate between the Swiss Franc and the Israeli Shekel, and a safe investment in a oneyear deposit that ensures the investor a certain return independent of the aforementioned exchange rate.
The two investment decisions can be drawn as follows: One of the risky investments was designed so that with some probability there is a possibility for loss (a). The other risky investment does not face the investors with a possible loss (A). The outcome of the two risky alternatives is equal and the outcome of the two riskless alternatives is equal. We would expect risk averse investor to prefer the riskless investment to the risky one in both investment decisions, or in other words, to reduce the variance of their investment"s outcomes in both decisions. We would also expect risk-lover investors to prefer the 23 risky investment to the safe one in both decisions. Choosing the risky investment in the first decision and the riskless investment in the second decision can be only explained by loss aversion.
Results
The subjects" choices in the two investment decisions are summarized in Table 4I . The rows reflect the choice between a risky investment with no potential losses (denoted as A) and a safe investment (denoted as B). The columns reflect the choice between a risky investment with potential losses (denoted as a) and a safe investment (denoted as b). The findings show that 60.88% of the subjects preferred the safe investment to the risky one in both investment decisions. The results yielded a significant chi square statistic χ²(1)=60.36, p<0.001. Consequently, not only loss aversion but mainly risk aversion did influence a substantial part of the professional subjects in their decision. In comparison with the nonprofessional subjects, their decisions did not significantly document on risk aversion, but were significantly influenced by loss aversion.
4.B. The Disposition Effect
In order to examine the impact of the disposition effect on the professionals" investment decision in structured products, the subjects faced two investment alternatives. Both alternatives represent 24 two very similarly structured products. The only difference between the alternatives is that in the first, in the worst-case scenario, the initial fund is mandatorily converted into equity, while in the second alternative, in the worst-case scenario the investor is given a cash settlement. The subjects were informed that the implied price of the underlying asset upon conversion exceeds the market price of the share at maturity, i.e. losses while not realized, have been accrued.
Should the majority of investors prefer the mandatory conversion structure to the cash alternative, this would constitute evidence of the prevalence of the disposition effect on investment decision-making.
Results
The professional subjects" choices are summarized in Table 4II . The left column represents the percentage of investors who preferred the mandatory convertible structure product to the nonconvertible one. As reported in Table 4II , 60.5% of the subjects preferred the mandatory conversion to liquidation. The results yielded a significant chi square statistic χ²(1)=26.26, p<0.001.
Apparently, the disposition effect played a role in decision-making for a majority of the professional subjects. As found in previous literature, we also find strong evidence that investor sophistication tends to reduce the magnitude of the bias. The nonprofessional subjects" decisions in our first experiment were influenced more by the disposition effect.
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4.C. Herd Behavior
To test the impact of herd behavior on investment decision-making for structured products, the subjects faced two investment decisions. Both investment decisions offer the investor a choice between two structured products. In one of the investment alternatives, the return is linked to the performance of a "fashionable" financial asset, and in the other investment alternative, the return is linked to the performance of an "unfashionable" financial asset.
A financial asset is considered "fashionable" due to its appearance in the mass media. We chose two different "fashionable" financial assets. One of them is a "cleantech" fund that invests in companies that are engaged in technological developments designed to help protect the environment. The other fashionable financial asset is an emerging market index. In each investment decision, the subjects were asked to choose between a "fashionable" structured product and an "unfashionable" one, all the other conditions being equal. The subjects were informed that both underlying assets in every investment decision (the "fashionable" and the "unfashionable") performed equally over the past year.
The experiment also contained three ranking questions in order to ensure that the investment decisions were not affected by other values. The professional subjects were asked to rank the values appearing in every investment alternative according to importance. We did not find any significant discrepancies between the importance rankings of the different values.
Therefore, these values appear not to provide a satisfactory explanation of the investor choice.
Should a majority of investors prefer the "fashionable" over the "unfashionable" structure in each case, this would support the hypothesis that herd behavior comes into play in investor decision-making. Tables 4IIIa and 4IIIb. Table 4IIIa represents the choice between a structured product specializing in "cleantech" environmental enterprises and a structured product whose return is linked to the performance of a fund specializing in startups, all other conditions being equal. Table 4IIIb represents the choice between a structured product tracking an emerging market index and one tracking a developed market index, all other conditions being equal. As reported in Table 4IIIa , 68.07% of the subjects preferred the "fashionable" cleantech product to the less fashionable start-up fund. The results yielded a significant chi square statistic χ²(1)=77.69, p<0.001. As reported in Table 4IIIb , 85.86% of the subjects preferred the "fashionable" emerging market product to the "less fashionable" developed market alternative.
Results
Investment decision preferences are summarized in
The results yielded a significant chi square statistic χ²(1)=305.5, p<0.001. Consequently, herd 27 behavior apparently did affect the decision of a majority of subjects. Interestingly, the effect of herd behavior on professionals" decisions was a little weaker than the effect on nonprofessionals" decisions in the "environmental" investment decision, and was a little stronger than the effect on nonprofessionals" decisions in the "emerging market" investment decision, but overall the herding tendency was very similar for both groups.
4.D. The Ostrich Effect
To examine the impact of the ostrich effect on structured product investments, the professional subjects faced two alternatives. Both alternatives are similar structured products. The only difference between the two alternatives is that the first is non-negotiable and the second is a highly liquid product, which can be redeemed by the issuer or traded on a secondary market. All the other conditions are equal.
When compared with an otherwise identical illiquid asset, a liquid asset should have a lower yield to maturity, given the opportunity to liquidate the position on demand and the possibility of realizing larger market returns without jeopardizing the locked-in yield-tomaturity. Accordingly, we would expect rational investors to prefer the liquid over nonnegotiable structures.
Unlike all the other investment decisions in our experiment, we presented investors with two alternatives to which they should be indifferent; this investment decision includes a superior alternative. Should any significant segment of investors prefer the inferior illiquid to the liquid structure, this would provide evidence supporting the existence of the ostrich effect on investor decision-making.
Results
Professional investors" selections are summarized in Table 4IV . The left column represents the percentage of investors who preferred the illiquid structure product to the liquid one. As reported in Table 4IV , 20.24% of the subjects preferred the non-negotiable over the liquid structure. This finding yielded a significant chi square statistic p<0.001. Consequently, the ostrich effect did have an apparent impact on decision-making for a significant segment of the subjects. In comparison with the nonprofessionals" decisions, the ostrich effect influenced the professionals" decisions less.
4.E. Hindsight Bias
To examine the possible impact of hindsight bias on investments in structured products, the professional subjects faced two investment alternatives, comprising two similar structured products. The sole distinction between the alternatives is that returns on the first are contingent on an outcome that has occurred in the recent past, while those of the second are contingent on an outcome not recently experienced. All other conditions are equal.
The existence of a hindsight bias is supported if a majority of investors prefer the investment whose return depends on an outcome that has recently occurred.
Results
Professional investors" selections are summarized in Table 4V . The left column represents the percentage of investors who preferred the "hindsighted" structured product over the other. Table 4V reveals that 63.36% of the subjects preferred the hindsighted structured. The results yielded a significant chi square statistic χ²(1)=42.48, p<0.001. Consequently, the hindsight bias does apparently come into play in professional investors" decision-making. In comparison with the nonprofessionals" decisions, our professionals were less hindsight-biased.
Do Personal Characteristics Influence the Magnitude of the Behavioral Bias?
The experiment results show us that even professional investors are not really immune to behavioral biases. In this part of the paper we try to figure out whether within this group of professional investors, there are certain personal characteristics which may influence the magnitude of the bias. In order to test this we asked our subject to fill in a short survey, which deals with some of their personal characteristics. To measure the influence of the personal characteristics and its significance we use three different econometric models to each tested behavioral bias.
5.1.Methodology
In the classical regression model the dependent variable can take any value on the real line. In our case the dependent variable, y, is a discrete outcome of a decision made by the subjects. In other words, y is a binary variable which takes only two values-o when the subject is not biased and 1 when the subject is biased. The linear probability model (LPM) is simple to estimate and use, but it has some drawbacks dealing with a binary dependent variable. The limitations of the LPM can be overcome by using a more sophisticated binary response model (Wooldridge, 2009) .
The binary response model we are using is of the form:
When y is the conviction of a specific behavioral bias and x is the full set of explanatory variables, i.e. the personal characteristics including gender, higher education, professional experience, license, investment committee membership, and board membership. G is a function taking on values strictly between zero and one: 0<G(z)<1, for all real numbers z.
We are using two nonlinear functions for the function G, which are used in the vast majority of applications (Wooldridge, 2009) . In the logit model, G is the logistic function:
G(z) is between zero and one for all real numbers z. This is the cumulative distribution function for a standard logistic random variable. In the probit model, G is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf), which again ensures that the regression equation is strictly between zero and one for all values of the parameters and the xj.
We also report the linear probability model (LPM) estimates, using the hetroskedasticityrobust standard errors. For the linear probability model we report the usual R-square reported for 31 OLS models, for the logit and the probit models we report the pseudo R-squared. The results, with standard errors in parentheses, are given in the following tables: The estimates from the three models tell a consistent story. The signs of the coefficients are the same across models, and the same variables are statistically significant in each model. The only significant explanatory variable in this model is the investment committee membership. We found that this membership reduces the tendency for loss aversion by around 11%. The other explanatory variables do not carry any significant marginal effect on the tendency for loss aversion. The estimates from the three models tell a consistent story. The signs of the coefficients are the same across models, and the same variables are statistically significant in each model. We found two significant explanatory variables in this model: the number of years of higher education and the license type. We found that the years of higher education reduce the herding tendency by 35 around 2.5%, and the investment advisor license increase the herding tendency by around 11% as opposed to the portfolio management license. The other explanatory variables do not carry any significant marginal effect on the herding tendency in this part of the experiment. The estimates from the three models tell a consistent story. The signs of the coefficients are the same across models, and the same variables are statistically significant in each model. We did 36 not find any powerful significant explanatory variable in this model to the tendency for the ostrich effect. The estimates from the three models tell a consistent story. The signs of the coefficients are the same across models, and the same variables are statistically significant in each model. We did not find any powerful significant explanatory variable in this model to the tendency for the hindsight bias.
5.B. The Disposition Effect
5.D. The Ostrich
5.E. Hindsight Bias
To conclude this part of the analysis, overall the personal characteristics do not carry any meaningful explanatory power on the tendency for behavioral biases. In few biases we found that a specific personal characteristic do have a significant marginal effect on the conviction of the behavioral bias, but we did not find any consistency among these personal characteristics and among their causal relationship with the relevant behavioral bias. Apparently, the tested behavioral finance patterns are so deeply rooted in human behavior that they are difficult to overcome by any one of the personal characteristics we analyzed.
Discussion and Conclusions
Structured products are synthetic investment instruments specially designed to meet specific needs that cannot be met by acquiring standard financial instruments available in the markets.
Structured products can be used as an alternative to direct investments in financial assets, as a means to mitigate risk exposure of a portfolio, or as a way of exploiting market trends.
We outlined several key features embedded in various structured products and associated each with specific behavioral bias identified in the literature of decision theory. These include: loss aversion, the disposition effect, herd behavior, the ostrich effect, and hindsight bias.
We performed an experiment to test the possible impact of each behavioral bias on decisions pertaining to investments in structured products. Our findings reveal that, to varying degrees, the examined behavioral biases affect professional investors. Moreover, using logit, probit and linear probability models we showed that the tested behavioral finance patterns are so deeply rooted in human behavior that they are difficult to overcome by any one of the personal characteristics we analyzed.
In demonstrating the impact of these behavioral biases on investors, our results can support the institution of specific regulation for structured products to improve investor protection. The proposed regulation should apply on both professional and nonprofessional investors, but can vary and can be shaped in different forms as sale prohibition or as different levels of mandatory disclosure.
As a modern alternative for household investment, structured products contribute to the completeness of financial markets by enhancing alternatives open to investors. The structured products are offering the investors different menu of investment alternatives than the traditional financial assets do offer. Therefore, a regulation which includes a sale prohibition can bear a tremendous cost to the completeness of financial markets and to the investors as consumers in this market.
Mandatory disclosure is a less extreme regulatory solution, and it can vary between different levels of disclosure. The optimal level of disclosure is the specific level in which we will get the highest available ratio between the added value to the investor"s protection as a result of the disclosure and the cost of disclosure.
We offer a regulation that would compel issuers to reveal the effective fees they charge investors. In disclosing the effective fees the investors will be able to compare between investment alternatives in a very simple way, and will be able to decide if they are willing to pay this amount for the recognized behavioral bias. This effective fee value is known to the issuers; therefore its calculation will not bear any additional cost.
In many cases in financial markets, when there are abnormal returns in the market, we can rely on the competitive forces of the economy to drive margins down to marginal cost. We provide a behavioral explanation for the abnormal returns in the structured products market. An additional explanation for the unproductiveness of the competitive forces in the context of structured products is provided by Carlin (2009) . He found that complexity increases the market power of the firms. In his model, as competition increases, firms tend to add more complexity to their prices as best response, rather than make their disclosures more transparent.
Disclosing the effective fee in structured products can improve the competition in this market. The diversity of the structured products offered in the market and their complexity is creating a difficulty in comparing between any two structured products and a difficulty to issue similar structured product to an existing one. Without a regulatory solution such as mandatory disclosure in the structured products market, issuing firms will continue to raise the complexity of the products and by that raise their profit margins. Therefore, increasing the market competition would enlarge the consumer surplus and contribute to the market efficiency.
To conclude, we have argued that in the context of structured products there is persuasive evidence that professional investors make major systematic errors. In Ofir and Wiener (2013) we got a similar result regarding the decisions of retail investors. Since all market players found to make these errors we deduce that the tested behavioral biases affect market prices and market efficiency substantially. Furthermore, as a result of mispricing there is a substantial misallocation of resources in the economy. Thus, we suggest that in the structured products" case, regulatory and legal policy can limit the damage caused by imperfect rationality. Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) Most structured products
